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Abstract
First Order ID-Logic interprets general ﬁrst order, non-
monotone, inductive deﬁnability by generalizing the well-
founded semantics for logic programs. We show that, for
general (thus perhaps inﬁnite) structures, inference in First
Order ID-Logic is complete Π
1
2 over the natural numbers. We
also prove a Skolem Theorem for the logic: every consistent
formula of First Order ID-Logic has a countable model.
1 Introduction
Many formalisms have been proposed for non-monotonic
reasoning. In search of semantics for logic programming,
a key intuition of some researchers has been that of induc-
tive deﬁnitions, as this view obviously applies for many pro-
totypical Horn programs such as transitive closure, mem-
ber, append, etc. In the last few years, the second author
and others have suggested taking this seriously, replacing
formalisms where induction is implicit with one where ex-
plicit inductive deﬁnability is in the heart of the formal-
ism. A key step was the realization that, as argued in
(Denecker, Bruynooghe, & Marek 2001), the well-founded
model semantics of logic programming (Van Gelder, Ross,
& Schlipf 1991) correctly formalizes the intuitions underly-
ing different types of inductive deﬁnitions, not only mono-
tone but also non-monotone inductive deﬁnitions over a
well-founded order, and transﬁnite and iterated induction.
This led (Denecker 2000; Denecker & Ternovska 2004;
2007) to propose ID-logic, an extension of classical logic
with generalized nonmonotone inductive deﬁnitions. Simi-
lar extensions of classical logic with inductive deﬁnitions, in
particular ﬁxpoints logics, are used in other areas of Com-
puter Science, but ID-logic differs from these by allowing a
uniform representation of a broader class of inductive deﬁ-
nitions.
To understand a logical formalism, we want to identify
what can be expressed in it, not only in the most natu-
ral circumstances, but also in the most extreme. Here,
in particular, we study the expressivity of First Order ID-
Logic (FO(ID)). In particular, we study ID-logic over arbi-
trary (and thus potentially inﬁnite) structures; the expres-
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sive power of FO(ID) over ﬁnite structures has been stud-
ied elsewhere (Mitchell & Ternovska 2005). By compari-
son, we just note that, in the context of ﬁnite structures, the
expressive power of FO(ID) is similar to that of ﬁrst order
logic. For example, for any ﬁxed FO(ID) formula φ, decid-
ing whether a ﬁnite structure for a given vocabulary τ is a
model of a FO(ID) formula is polynomial in the size of the
structure. (That is, the “data complexity” of FO(ID) is poly-
nomial. And, asinﬁrstorderlogic, theso-called“expression
complexity” is EXPTIME.) For a ﬁxed FO(ID) formula φ in
a vocabulary τ, and for τ0 ⊆ τ, determining whether a ﬁnite
τ0 structure is the projection (i.e., reduct) of a model of φ is
in NP and is NP-complete for certain FO(ID) formulas. And
determining whether a formula is satisﬁable in some ﬁnite
structure is complete r.e. — just as for ﬁrst order logic. For
any ﬁxed FO(ID) formula φ, there is a ﬁrst order formula φ0
in a larger language such that, for any ﬁnite structure A for
the language of φ, A |= φ if and only if A can be expanded
to a model of φ0 (Mitchell & Ternovska 2005). So, in that
sense, FO(ID) is no more expressive than ﬁrst order logic
over ﬁnite structures; FO(ID) provides only convenience in
modeling. Of course, from a practical point of view, this
modeling convenience may be considerable, since express-
ing an inductive deﬁnition in FO may amount to explicitly
encoding ﬁxpoint computations in FO. But, this is not a con-
cern in a study of expressive power.
In this paper we consider the expressive power of FO(ID)
over arbitrary structures. In particular, we determine how
undecidable it is to ask whether a FO(ID) theory is satis-
ﬁable, or whether a FO(ID) theory logically implies a ﬁrst
order formula. Fairly typically for nonmonotonic logics
(compare the survey in (Schlipf 1995)), the answers turn
out to come from higher order logics and generalized re-
cursion theory. We shall show that these decision problems
are complete-Σ1
2 and complete-Π1
2 over the integers, respec-
tively.
Here, in particular, we consider First Order ID-Logic
(FO(ID)). For completeness, we repeat the formal deﬁni-
tions, with some notational additions allowing condensed
discussion, but we do not repeat any motivating examples
for ID-Logic.1.1 Standard Logical Formalism
We use standard ﬁrst-order-logic notation for vocabularies
(languages) and structures. Of particular interest is the struc-
ture of arithmetic, N = hN;0,Succ,+,·i, where N is the set
{0,1,2,...} of natural numbers. (To simplify notation, here
we write the same symbol for the vocabulary element and its
interpretation, rather than writing 0N, etc.) For each natural
number n, let pnq be the term Succ
n(0), which names n.
Let A = hA;...i be a τ-structure. Let relation symbols
R1,...,Rm 6∈ τ, where each Ri is ki-ary. For 1 ≤ i ≤
m, let Si ⊆ Aki. Then A[S1/R1,...,Sm/Rm] is the τ ∪
{R1,...,Rm}-structure with universe A that interprets all
symbols in τ exactly as A does and interprets each Ri by Si.
We use a similar notation on environments (assignments of
global variables) on formulas: for ~ a an n-tuple of elements
of A and ~ x an n − tuple of variables, A |= φ(~ a/~ x) says
that φ is satisﬁed in A in the environment where each xi is
interpreted by ai.
For m-tuples ~ R = hR1,...,Rmi, ~ S = hS1,...,Smi of
sets, we write ~ R ⊆ ~ S to mean that each Ri ⊆ Si, and ~ R ⊂ ~ S
to mean in addition that one inclusion is proper. For S a set
of such m-tuples,
S
S is the the coordinate-by-coordinate
union.
Second Order (SO) Logic has two varieties of vari-
able symbols: ﬁrst order variables, written x,y,z,x1,...,
vary over elements of (the universe of) the structure
being discussed, while second order variables, written
R,S,X,Y,Z,R1,..., vary over relations of appropriate ar-
ity on the structure. Second order variables may be quanti-
ﬁed but otherwise have the same syntax as relation symbols
of the vocabulary. It is well-known that second order logic
is “grossly undecidable.”
Second order formulas are classiﬁed based on the number
of alternations of second order quantiﬁers. Formulas with
no second order quantiﬁers — thus only ﬁrst order variables
— are deﬁned to be both Σ1
0 and Π1
0. A formula is Σ1
k+1 if
it is of the form ∃X1 ...∃Xnφ where φ is Π1
k; it is Π1
k+1 if
it is of the form ∀X1 ...∀Xnφ where φ is Σ1
k. This is the
basis for the analytical hierarchy over the natural numbers
and, with a change at the 0th level, for the polynomial time
hierarchy over ﬁnite structures.
Each formula (ﬁrst or second order) ϕ in τ with free ﬁrst
order variables, say ~ x, deﬁnes an n-ary relation in the con-
text of a τ-structure M:
{~ a ∈ An : M |= ϕ(~ a/~ x)}.
A relation X in the domain of structure M is said to be Σ1
k
deﬁnable in M if it is deﬁnable over M by a Σ1
k formula. A
set X of integers is Σ1
k hard if, for every Σ1
k set Y , there is a
recursive function fY so that, for all integers y,
y ∈ Y if and only if fY (y) ∈ X.
A set is Σ1
k complete if it is both Σ1
k deﬁnable and Σ1
k hard.
The deﬁnitions of Π1
k deﬁnability, hardness and complete-
ness are analogous. In the context of natural numbers, where
we have recursive bijections from Nn to N (e.g., G¨ odel num-
bering), an n-ary relation is Σ1
k iff its mapping under this
bijection is a Σ1
k set. It therefore sufﬁces to study Σ1
k sets
(n = 1).
2 Induction in ID-Logic
Deﬁnition 2.1 An ( inductive) deﬁnition ∆, in a vocabulary
(language) τ, for relations R1,...,Rm 6∈ τ,1 is a set of
formulas ∆ =
{∀~ x[R1(~ x) ← φ1,1(~ x)], ···, ∀~ x[R1(~ x) ← φ1,n1(~ x)],
∀~ x[R2(~ x) ← φ2,1(~ x)], ···, ∀~ x[R2(~ x) ← φ2,n2(~ x)],
. . .
∀~ x[Rm(~ x) ← φm,1(~ x)], ···, ∀~ x[Rm(~ x) ← φk,nm(~ x)]}
where:
1. formulas φi,j are in ﬁrst order formulas of τ ∪
{R1,...,Rm} (we shall sometimes write φ(~ R,~ x) to em-
phasize the extra relation symbols);
2. symbol ← isanewbinarysymbol—calleddeﬁnitional
implication in ID-logic;
3. for ki the arity of Ri, in each formula
∀~ x[Ri(~ x) ← φi,j(~ x)], ~ x is x1x2 ...xki; and
4. we write φi,j(~ x) to indicate that the free variables of φi,j
are among ~ x.2
The intuition is that these rules inductively deﬁne the rela-
tions R1,...,Rm by (simultaneous) induction. Thus, the
individual formulas ∀~ x[Ri(~ x) ← φi,j(~ x)] are treated as
closure rules. For any τ-structure A and all ~ x in structure
A, whatever the interpretation of the Rhs are in A, if φi,j(~ x)
is true, then ~ x must be in (the interpretation of) Ri, and if
no φi,j(~ x) is true, then ~ x must not be in Ri. But this is not
a full speciﬁcation of what an inductive deﬁnition means.
The next section deﬁnes the formal semantics of inductive
deﬁnitions.
In ID-logic, the formulas ∀~ x[Ri(~ x) ← φi,j(~ x)] are
called deﬁnitional rules, with head Ri(~ x) and body φi,j(~ x).
The predicates R1,...,Rm are called the deﬁned predicates
of ∆, and all other symbols are called open symbols of ∆.
2.1 Positive Inductive Deﬁnability
When all occurrences of all deﬁned relation symbols Ri in
all the φh,j’s are positive,3 the inductive deﬁnition ∆ is also
referred to as positive. In this case, the semantics of induc-
tive deﬁnability is standard (see, e.g., (Moschovakis 1974a;
Aczel 1977; Barwise 1975; Immerman 1986; Vardi 1982)).
We quickly summarize it here.
1In (Denecker & Ternovska 2007), the vocabulary of ∆ is con-
sidered to be our τ ∪ {R1,...,Rm}. Deﬁning the vocabulary not
to include {R1,...,Rm} makes the discussion in this section a bit
more straightforward and also stays closer to the language of some
standard sources on inductive deﬁnitions, such as (Moschovakis
1974a; Aczel 1977; Barwise 1975). There is no signiﬁcant differ-
ence.
2(Denecker & Ternovska 2007) does allow other free variables
to appear in the φi,j’s. But in FO(ID) these free variables cannot
be quantiﬁed, so, for the questions asked in this paper, they can be
treated as constant symbols.
3An occurrence if a relation symbol R in a ﬁrst order formula φ
is positive if, when φ is converted to negation normal form, that oc-
currence of R is not in the scope of a ¬. Otherwise, the occurrence
of R is negative.Given a τ-structure A and an inductive deﬁnition ∆, de-
ﬁne an operator Γ∆ on m-tuples of relations: For relations
S1,...,Sm on A (each relation Si of the same arity as sym-
bol Ri), let, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m
S0
i = {~ x ∈ A : A[S1/R1,...,Sm/Rm] |=
_
1≤j≤ni
φi,j(~ x)}.
(1)
And let Γ∆(S1,...,Sm) = (S0
1,...,S0
m) (2)
Since the φi’s are all positive in all the Rj’s, operator Γ∆ is
monotone in its arguments. So by the Tarski-Knaster theo-
rem, it has a least ﬁxed point, which can be constructed by
induction:
~ S0 = (∅,...,∅), ~ Sα+1 = Γ∆(~ Sα) for α any ordinal,
and ~ Sλ =
[
α<λ
~ Sα for λ a limit ordinal.
Denote the least ﬁxed point by A∆ = (R
A,∆
1 ,...,RA,∆
m ).
Whenever A is obvious, write, simply, R∆
i . Each relation
R
A,∆
i is said to be positively inductively deﬁnable over A.
For any positive inductive deﬁnition ∆, and over any
structure A and for any sequence ~ a of values for the free
variables of A, the least ordinal β where ~ Sβ = Γ∆(~ Sβ) is
called the closure ordinal of ∆ (over A,~ a); we denote it by
|∆|A,~ a, or simply by |∆| where context makes A and~ a clear.
Note that if κ is an inﬁnite ordinal with more than |A| prede-
cessors (A the domain of A), then |∆| < κ, simply because
the sequence of ~ Sα’s is increasing and there are less than κ
possible tuples to add into the relations.
A key result for this paper is the following:
Theorem 2.1 (Kleene-Spector Theorem) A relation R on
the natural numbers is positively inductively deﬁnable over
N if and only if it is Π1
1 deﬁnable over N4.
2.2 Nonpositive Deﬁnitions
More complex forms of induction used in mathematics
are inherently non-monotonic. For instance, the standard
deﬁnition of the satisfaction relation |= contains the non-
monotonic rule
I |= ¬ϕ if I 6|= ϕ.
As observed in (Denecker, Bruynooghe, & Marek 2001), the
well-founded model semantics of logic programming (Van
Gelder, Ross, & Schlipf 1991) uniformally formalizes the
intuitions underlying different types of inductive deﬁnitions,
not only monotone but also non-monotone inductive deﬁni-
tions over a well-founded order, and transﬁnite and iterated
induction.5 Thus, ID-logic uses the well-founded semantics
for inductive deﬁnitions ∆ in which the φi’s need not be
positive in all their arguments.
4This result has been generalized to broad classes of countably
inﬁnite structures; see, e.g., (Barwise 1975; Moschovakis 1974a).
5A sort of non-monotonic induction not formalized by the
well-founded model semantics is the “inﬂationary” induction of
(Moschovakis 1974b).
There are many ways of formalizing the well-founded se-
mantics. For the purposes of this paper, the alternating ﬁxed
point construction of the well-founded semantics for logic
programs (Van Gelder 1993) is well-suited — extended in
the obvious way to the broader class of inductive deﬁnitions
deﬁned above. For completeness, we present it here; for
more discussion and many examples, again see (Denecker
& Ternovska 2007).
Deﬁnition 2.2 Let ∆ be an inductive deﬁnition in vocabu-
lary τ. For i = 1,...,m, let R
−
i be a new6relation sym-
bol of the same arity as Ri. For each deﬁnitional rule
∀~ x[Ri(~ x) ← φi,j(~ x)], form rule ∀~ x[Ri(~ x) ← ˆ φi,j(~ x)]
by replacing each negative occurrence of each Rh in φi,j
with R
−
h . Let ˆ ∆ be the set of these new deﬁnitional rules.
Observe that ˆ ∆ is a positive inductive deﬁnition
of R1,...,Rm over A[S1/R
−
1 ,...,Sm/R−
m]. Call
its least ﬁxed point, A[S1/R
−
1 ,...,Sm/R−
m]
ˆ ∆, simply
S∆(S1,...,Sm).
The above deﬁnition thus deﬁnes an operator of tuples of
relations, mapping (S1,...,Sm) to S∆(S1,...,Sm). It ex-
tends the well-known stable operator of logic programming
(Gelfond & Lifschitz 1991).
Van Gelder’s Intuition for the Alternating Fixed Point
Construction (phrased in the vocabulary of ID-Logic):
Suppose there is a “correct” interpretation RA
i of each Ri.
1. An inductively deﬁnable set should have only ele-
ments that are somehow “forced” to be in the set, so
S∆(RA
1 ,...,RA
m) should be (RA
1 ,...,RA
m).
2. If (S1,...,Sm) ⊂ (RA
1 ,...,RA
m), then negative literals
¬R
−
i in rule bodies will be true “too often,” so
S∆(S1,...,Sm) ⊇ (RA
1 ,...,RA
m).
3. Similarly, if (S1,...,Sm) ⊃ (RA
1 ,...,RA
m), the negative
subgoals will be true “too seldom,” so S∆(S1,...,Sm) ⊆
(RA
1 ,...,RA
m).
Formally, since the R
−
i ’s occur only negatively in ˆ ∆,
operator S∆ is anti-monotone, and hence (S∆)2 is mono-
tone. So the intuition gives us, for the “correct” relations
~ RA = (RA
1 ,...,RA
m) and~ ∅ = (∅,...,∅):
~ ∅ ⊆ (S∆)2(~ ∅) ⊆ (S∆)4(~ ∅) ⊆ ··· ⊆ ~ RA = S∆( ~ RA)
⊆ ···(S∆)5(~ ∅) ⊆ (S∆)3(~ ∅) ⊆ S∆(~ ∅).
(3)
And (S∆)2 has a least ﬁxed point, ~ S∞, constructible by
transﬁnite induction:
~ S0 = ~ ∅,
~ Sα+1 = (S∆)2(~ Sα) (α any ordinal),
~ Sλ =
S
α<λ ~ Sα (λ a limit ordinal),and
~ S∞ = the least ﬁxed point.
6By “new” we imply that the symbols R
−
i are all distinct and
that none are in τ ∪ {R1,...,Rm}.Using the monotonicity and anti-monotonicity of respec-
tively (S∆)2 and S∆, we can prove a result slightly weaker
than (3):
~ ∅ ⊆ (S∆)2(~ ∅) ⊆ (S∆)4(~ ∅) ⊆ ··· ⊆ ~ S∞ ⊆ S∆(~ S∞)
⊆ ···(S∆)5(~ ∅) ⊆ (S∆)3(~ ∅) ⊆ S∆(~ ∅).
Thus, in case ~ S∞ = S∆(~ S∞), we have fully captured the
intuition above.
Deﬁnition 2.3 For an inductive deﬁnition ∆ in τ, any τ
structure A, and ~ S∞ as above, if S∆(~ S∞) = ~ S∞, we say
deﬁnition ∆ deﬁnes A∆ = ~ S∞ = (R
A,∆
1 ,...,RA,∆
m ) induc-
tively; we also say ∆ deﬁnes each R
A,∆
i inductively. Other-
wise, we say that A∆ and all R
A,∆
i ’s are undeﬁned.
The least ordinal α where ~ Sα = ~ Sα+2 is called the clo-
sure ordinal of ∆ (over A,~ a); it is denoted |∆|A,~ a — or
simply |∆| when A,~ a are clear.
As with positive induction, if κ is an inﬁnite ordinal with
more than |A| predecessors, then |∆| < κ.
Proposition 2.2 Let A be a τ-structure.
1. If ∆ is a positive inductive deﬁnition in τ, then ∆ deﬁnes
the same relations over A in ID-logic than it does in ﬁrst
order positive inductive deﬁnability.
2. If relations S1,...,Sm are inductively deﬁnable in ID-
logic over A, and relation S is inductively deﬁnable in
ID-logic over structure A[S1/R1,...,Sm/Rm], then S
is inductively deﬁnable in ID-logic over A.
3. The set of relations inductively deﬁnable over A in ID-
logic is closed under boolean combinations and projec-
tions.
Proof:
1. Since the inductively deﬁned relations do not occur neg-
atively in ∆, the tuple S∆(S1,...,Sm) does not depend
upon S1,...,Sm. Hence (S∆)2(~ ∅) is a ﬁxed point and
equals (S∆)3(~ ∅).
2. This is a standard consequence of the monotonicity of
(S∆)2 (sometimes referred to as showing that iterated in-
duction is the same as simultaneous induction); compare
the Transitivity Theorem 1.C.3 of (Moschovakis 1974a).
Alternatively, it is also a simple consequence of the ab-
stract stratiﬁcation theorem 3.11 for non-monotone oper-
ators (Vennekens, Gilis, & Denecker 2006).
3. By part (2), if ∆ deﬁnes R1,...,R4 (and R1,R2 have the
same arity, and R4 has arity > 1), then ∆ ∪ { R∪(~ x) ←
R1(~ x) ∨ R2(~ x), R∩(~ x) ← R1(~ x) ∧ R2(~ x), R¬(~ x) ←
¬R3(~ x), Rπ(~ x) ← ∃yR4(~ x,y) } deﬁnes the desired
union, intersection, complement, and projection.
Observation 2.3 The above proposition shows a key differ-
ence between positive inductive deﬁnability and the induc-
tive deﬁnability in ID-logic: over many inﬁnite structures,
e.g. the structure N for arithmetic, the class of ﬁrst or-
der positively inductively deﬁnable sets is not closed under
complementation. Thus, over such structures, the inductive
deﬁnitions of ID-logic are very different than in ﬁrst order
positive inductive deﬁnability.
On the other hand, Immerman and Vardi proved (Immer-
man 1986; Vardi 1982) proved that, over ﬁnite structures,
theclassofrelationsthatare(uniformly)positiveinductively
deﬁnable is closed under complementation.
3 FO(ID)
FirstOrderInductiveDeﬁnitionLogic(FO(ID))extendsﬁrst
order logic with inductive deﬁnitions. We merely give the
formal deﬁnition here; see (Denecker & Ternovska 2007)
for many motivating examples.
An FO(ID) formula over is deﬁned by adding an addi-
tional base case to the standard inductive rules deﬁning ﬁrst
order formulas over a vocabulary τ:
• A deﬁnition ∆ of predicate symbols R1,...,Rm in τ \
{R1,...,Rm} is an FO(ID) formula in τ. ∆ may contain
free variables.
Thus, the construction units of FO(ID) are the atoms and the
deﬁnitions, and the logic is closed under conjunction, dis-
junction, negation, existential and universal quantiﬁcation.
Since rule bodies of deﬁnitions are FO, nested deﬁnitions
are not allowed in FO(ID), contrary to, e.g., the logic LFP
(Libkin 2004).
Deﬁnition 3.1 A FO(ID) theory T in a vocabulary τ is a set
of FO(ID) sentences in τ.
Deﬁnition 3.2 The satisfaction relation — denoted |=[ID]
— of FO(ID) is deﬁned by the same structural rules deﬁning
satisfaction |= of FO, augmented with one extra base rule:
• for a structure A interpreting τ and all free variables of
∆, let A0 be the reduct of A to τ0 = τ \ {R1,...,Rn}.
We deﬁne A |= ∆ if (A0)∆ exists and each R
A
0,∆
i is equal
to RA
i (the interpretation of Ri in A).
Example 3.1 Let ∆1,∆2 be two inductive deﬁnitions of
the same set {R1,...,Rm} of relations. A structure A =
hA;...,RA
1 ,...,RA
mi is a model of ∆1 ∧ ∆2 if and only
if RA
1 ...RA
m are the relations deﬁned by ∆1 and also are
the relations deﬁned by ∆2 — so, in particular, only if it
turns out that the relations deﬁned by ∆1 and ∆2 over
A0 = hA;...i are the same.
For T a theory of FO(ID) and φ an FO(ID) sentence, T
logically implies φ — written T |=[ID] φ — if φ is true in
every model of T. Note that, just as in ﬁrst order logic, for
φ a sentence of FO(ID), T |=[ID] φ if and only if T ∪ {¬φ}
is unsatisﬁable.7
4 Inference in FO(ID) is Π1
2 over Arithmetic
Our proof below is heavily dependent upon (i) formalization
of model theory in the universe V of sets (with relation ∈),
and (ii) results in ordinal recursion theory.
7Note that a deﬁnitional rule φ is not an FO(ID) sentence, such
that T |=[ID] φ is not deﬁned.4.1 Background in Set Theory
In this paper we use several results about deﬁnability in set
theory. We summarize them here and in the next section.
(Proofs of theorems can be found in, for example, (Barwise
1975).)
The vocabulary of set theory is {∈}; the usual axioms
are the Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) axioms plus the Axiom of
Choice (AC). It is assumed that there is a real universe of
sets, called V , and that it satisﬁes ZF+AC. When we talk
about deﬁnability in set theory, we talk about deﬁnability in
V , not in arbitrary models of ZF+AC.
An {∈}-formula is ∆0 if it is built up from atomic formu-
las using only boolean connectives and bounded quantiﬁca-
tion: ∃x ∈ yφ (deﬁned to be ∃x(x ∈ y ∧ φ)) and ∀x ∈ yφ
(deﬁned to be ∀x(x ∈ y → φ)). A formula is Σ1 if it is of
the form ∃x1,...,xkφ where φ is ∆0. An important result
(provable even in a fairly weak set theory such as KPU) is
that if ψ1,ψ2 are Σ1 formulas and x,y are any variable sym-
bols, then (ψ1 ∨ ψ2), (ψ1 ∧ ψ2), ∃x ∈ yψ1, and ∀x ∈ yψ1
are equivalent to Σ1 formulas.
Recall that, for a set theorist, objects such as structures,
formulas and tuples are all special kinds of sets. For ex-
ample, a structure A = hA,RA
1 ,...,RA
k i for a vocabu-
lary τ = {R1,...,Rm} can be represented as a tuple
hA,{hn1,RA
1 i,...,hnk,RA
k i}i with ni the G¨ odel-number
of symbol Ri. And τ-formulas may be represented, for ex-
ample, by their G¨ odel numbers. The standard inductive def-
inition of satisfaction is by an induction that can be captured
by a straightforward Σ1 formula:
Theorem 4.1 ThereisaΣ1 formulaχSat(`,s,f,x,v)ofset
theory such that,
V |= χSat(τ/`,A/s,φ/f,~ x/x,~ a/v) if and only if
• τ is a ﬁnite language,
• A is a τ-structure,
• φ is (the G¨ odel number of) a ﬁrst order formula of τ,
• for some natural number n, ~ x is the n-tuple of all free
variable symbols of φ, and ~ a is an n-tuple of elements of
A, and
• A |= φ(~ a/~ x).
A set or class S of sets is transitive if whenever any x ∈ S
and y ∈ x, y ∈ S. A (von Neumann) ordinal is a set that
is transitive and linearly ordered by relation ∈. The class
of ordinals is also linearly ordered by ∈, and the axioms of
ZF prove that this is a well-ordering in V . On ordinals α,β,
α < β meansα ∈ β, andα = β+1meansα = β∪{β}. (By
compactness, there are “non-standard” models of ZF+AC,
where the “ordinals” are not well-ordered, but that is not a
concern here; we are working over V .)
It is obvious than when a Σ1
1 formula ∃X1 ...∃Xkψ
(with free variables ~ x) uniformly deﬁnes relations SA in
τ-structures A, then these relations SA can be deﬁned uni-
formly in V by a Σ1 formula:
SA = {~ a ∈ An : V |= ∃Y1 ...∃Yk
(χSat(τ0/l,A[Y1/X1,...,Yk/Xk]/s,ψ/f,~ x/x,~ a/v))}
where τ0 = τ∪{X1,...,Xk}, i.e., the symbols X1,...,Xn
are now treated as predicate constants.
But the converse fails:
Example 4.1 (Well-known) Suppose τ contains binary re-
lation G.
1. There is no Σ1
1 formula ∃ ~ Xφ(x,y) uniformally deﬁning
the transitive closure of G in all τ-structures A. This
follows directly from compactness for ﬁrst order logic.
Indeed, assume towards contradiction that Σ1
1 formula
∃ ~ Xφ expresses the transitive closure of G. Consider the
inﬁnite theory Ψ = {¬G(a,b),¬∃x0 ...∃xn(G(a,x0) ∧
... ∧ G(xn,b)) : n ∈ N}, where a,b are constants not
appearing in ∃ ~ Xφ. Clearly, Ψ∪{∃ ~ Xφ(a,b)} is unsatisﬁ-
able, and so is Ψ ∪ {φ(a,b)}. By compactness of FO, the
latter theory should have a ﬁnite unsatisﬁable subset, and
this is clearly not the case.
2. But there is a Σ1 formula ψ(s,x,y) of set theory where
V |= ψ(A/s,d/x,d0/y) if and only if (d,d0) is in the
transitive closure of GA. The formula is — in mixed
formal notation and English —
∃f,α( (α is a natural number) ∧ (f : α + 1→A)∧
f(0) = x ∧ f(α) = y∧
∀n ∈ α(G(f(n),f(n + 1)))
)
Theorem 4.2 There is a Σ1 formula χposInd(`,s,d,x,v,r)
of set theory where
V |= χposInd(τ/`,A/s,∆/d,~ v/x,~ a/v,hS1,...,Smi/r)
if and only if
1. τ is a ﬁnite language,
2. A is a τ structure,
3. ∆ is a positive inductive deﬁnition of some relations
R1,...,Rm 6∈ τ, with m the length of hS1,...,Smi, and
with free variables ~ x = x1,...,xn,
4. the arity of each Si is the same as of Ri and ~ a is an n-
tuple of elements of A (for n as above), and
5. hS1,...,Smi = A∆, where the environment binds each
vi to ai.
For a proof of the above, again see, e.g., (Barwise 1975).
(And the same approach is used in our proof of Lemma 4.6.)
There is a Σ1 formula that identiﬁes the list of symbols Ri
and their arities from the syntactic form of ∆.
4.2 Background in Constructibility and Ordinal
Recursion Theory
G¨ odel proved the relative consistency of the axiom of choice
and the continuum hypothesis using a smaller class of sets,
the class of constructible sets, called L. The constructible
sets are constructed by transﬁnite induction over all ordinals
α ∈ V ; L(α) is the set of sets thus constructed before stage
α. Each L(α), as well as L, is transitive.
Theorem 4.3 (absoluteness of ∆0 and persistence of Σ1)
Let S be a transitive set or class of sets. For any ∆0 formulaφ(~ x), and for any vector ~ s of appropriate length and of
elements of S,
S |= φ(~ s/~ x) if and only if V |= φ(~ s/~ x).
For any Σ1 formula φ(~ x), and for any vector ~ s of appropri-
ate length and of elements of S,
if S |= φ(~ s/~ x) then V |= φ(~ s/~ x).
An ordinal σ is stable if, for every Σ1 formula φ with free
variables among ~ x, and for every ~ a ∈ L(σ), L |= φ[~ a/~ x]
if and only if L(σ) |= φ[~ a/~ x] — i.e., in standard notation,
L(σ) ≺1 L. There are countable stable ordinals. The least
one is called σ0. It is not difﬁcult to show that the structure
N ∈ L(σ0), which makes L(σ0) suitable to study expressive
power in the context of N.
Theorem 4.4 A relation R on the natural numbers is Σ1
2
deﬁnable on N if and only if it is Σ1-deﬁnable on L(σ0).
Theorem 4.5 (Schoenﬁeld Absoluteness Theorem) Every
Σ1 sentence (i.e.,formula with no free variables) of set
theory true in V is also true in L.
It is an easy generalization to show that, if θ(x) is a Σ1
formula whose only free variable is x, and if n is an integer,
if V |= θ(n/x) then L |= θ(n/x).
4.3 Inference in FO(ID) is Π1
2 over N
Lemma 4.6 There is a Σ1 formula
∃α,δ,F,π, ˆ d,w(θwfInd(α,δ,F,π, ˆ d,`,s,d,x,v,r,w))
of set theory where θwfInd is ∆0 and
V |= θwfInd(τ/`,A/s,∆/d,~ x/x,~ a/v,hS1,...,Smi/r,u/w)
if and only if
1. τ is a ﬁnite language,
2. A is a τ structure,
3. ∆ is a deﬁnition of some relations R1,...,Rm 6∈ τ, with
m the length of hS1,...,Smi, and with free variables ~ x
equal to some x1,...,xn,
4. the arities of each Si is the same as of Ri and ~ a is an
n-tuple of elements of A (for n as above), and,
5. in the notation of formula 2.2, hS1,...,Smi is the least
ﬁxed point of (S∆)2.
Proof:
The constructions for parts (1-4) are fairly standard, so
we omit them; see, e.g., the proof of our Theorem 4.1 in
(Barwise 1975).
Theorem 4.2 shows that positive induction is Σ1 deﬁn-
able, say by formula ∃~ yθ(`,s,d,x,v,r,~ y). The alternating
ﬁxed point construction is by induction, where each stage
of the induction uses positive inductive deﬁnition. To cap-
ture the inner induction we use χposInd; to capture the outer
induction, we use a function F with domain an ordinal α
(where, in light of earlier remarks, we could choose α to be
any inﬁnite ordinal with > |A| predecessors).
For each ordinal β in its domain, F(β) wil be an ordered
pair
hA[S1/R
−
1 ,...,Sm/R−
m],~ yi, (4)
where each inductively deﬁned predicate Ri has been split
intopositiveoccurrencesRi andnegativeoccurrencesR
−
i as
in Deﬁnition 2.2 — and ~ y will be witnesses for existensial
quantiﬁers, as noted below. Below, let
• F(β)A be A[S1/s
−
1 ,...,Sm/s−
m],
• F(β)(i) be the Si in F(β), and
• F(β)(~ y) be the ~ y of F(β).
Formally, we can replace mention of them below with ∆0
formulas involving F(β).
Our formula is
∃α,δ,F,π, ˆ d
( π is a parsing function witnessing that φ deﬁnes ~ r
∧ ˆ d is constructed from d as in Deﬁnition 2.2
∧ α,δ are ordinals ∧ (δ + 2 < α)
∧ F is a function with domain α
∧ ∀β < α(F(β) is of the form of (4))
∧ F(δ) = F(δ + 2) (so a ﬁxpoint has been reached)
∧ hF(δ)(1),...,F(δ)(m)i ⊆
hF(δ + 1)(1),...,F(δ + 1)(m)i
∧
V
1≤i≤m F(0)(i) = ∅
∧ ∀β < α(β is a successor ordinal →
θ(`,F(β − 1)A, ˆ d,x,v,
hF(β)(1),...,F(β)(m)i,F(β)(~ y))
∧ ∀β < α(β is a limit ordinal → V
1≤i≤m F(β)(i) =
S
γ<β(F(γ)(i) ∩ F(γ + 1)(i))
∧
V
1≤i≤m ∀~ x(~ x ∈ ri ↔ ~ x ∈ F(δ)(i))
)
It is fairly clear that the formula “says” that F encodes the
stages of the alternating ﬁxed point construction and that
F(δ) is a ﬁxed point of (S∆)2. But there are really two
ﬁxed points achieved this way, ~ S∞ and S∆(~ S∞). As noted
earlier, ~ S∞ ⊆ S∆(~ S∞), so the line following the ﬁxed point
condition F(δ) = F(δ + 2) states that F(δ) gives the in-
tended one. For a limit ordinal β, we should express that the
F(β)(i)’s are the limit of earlier lower approximations. For
each γ < β, the intersection F(γ)(i) ∩ F(γ + 1)(i) is the
lower approximation of the pair Sγ,i,Sγ+1,i.
It can be shown that each of the conjuncts following the
initial ∃α,δ,F,~ r,z is expressible with a ∆0 formula. It can
be shown that replacement/reﬂection axioms of ZF show
that the function F itself exists (indeed, this is basically just
the standard proof that in set theory one can do deﬁnition by
recursion).
Theorem 4.7 There is a Σ1 formula χFO(ID)(`,s,f,x,v)
of set theory where
V |= χFO(ID)(τ/`,A/s,φ/f,~ x/x,~ a/v) if and only if
1. τ is a ﬁnite language,
2. A is a τ structure,
3. φ is a formula of FO(ID) with free variables ~ x,
4. ~ a is a tuple of elements of A, of the same length as ~ x, and5. A |= φ(~ a/~ x).
Proof (sketch):
This construction repeats the standard construction used
for Theorem 4.1. First use existensial quantiﬁcation to pro-
duce the parse π for φ. The construction is now by induction
on the nodes the parse tree. The only new step for ID-logic is
to handle the base case of deﬁnitions. In fact, there are two
new base cases. Indeed, we assume that the formula is in
negation normal form, so that the only negative occurrences
of inductive deﬁnitions ∆ are in the form ¬∆. We cannot
express that A |= ¬∆(~ a/~ x) through ¬(A |= ∆(~ a/~ x)) since
then, the Σ1 formula expressing A |= ∆(~ a/~ x) would appear
under negation, and Σ1 formulas are not closed under nega-
tion. Fortunately, we can say that A |= ¬∆(~ a/~ x) by a Σ1
formula, and this is our second base case.
Say A |= ∆(~ a/~ x) by writing
∃p,l0,s0,α,δ,F,π, ˆ d,r
( p is the tuple of deﬁned predicates of ∆
∧ `0 = ` \ p ∧ s0 = the reduct of A to l0
∧ θwfInd(α,δ,F,π, ˆ d,`0,s0,∆/d,~ x/x,~ a/v,r)
∧
V
1≤i≤m F(δ)(i) = F(δ + 1)(i) ∧
V
1≤i≤m pA
i = ri
).
Say A |= ¬∆(~ a/~ x) by writing
∃p,l0,s0,α,δ,F,π, ˆ d,r
( p is the tuple of deﬁned predicates of ∆
∧ `0 = ` \ p ∧ s0 = the reduct of A to l0
∧ θwfInd(α,δ,F,π, ˆ d,`0,s0,∆/d,~ x/x,~ a/v,r)
∧
W
1≤i≤m F(δ)(i) 6= F(δ + 1)(i) ∨
W
1≤i≤m pA
i 6= ri
).
Corollary 4.8 There is a Σ1 formula χSATID(f) of set the-
ory so that a FO(ID) sentence φ is satisﬁable if and only
if V |= χSATID(φ/f), and φ is satisﬁable if and only if
L(σ0) |= χSATID(φ/f).
Proof: The formula χSATID(f) =
∃`,sχFO(ID)(`,s,f,∅,∅) clearly satisﬁes the ﬁrst property.
It is also routine to show that if L(σ0) |= χSATID(φ/f)
then φ is indeed satisﬁable.
So now suppose φ is satisﬁable — so V |= χSATID(φ/f).
Recall that we represented formulas in set theory with their
G¨ odel numbers. By the generalization of the Schoen-
ﬁeld Absoluteness Theorem, L |= χSATID(φ/f). Since
σ0 is a stable ordinal (and thus also inﬁnite), L(σ0) |=
χSATID(φ/f).
Corollary 4.9 (Skolem Theorem for FO(ID)) For φ a for-
mula of FO(ID), if φ has a model, it has a countable (ﬁnite
or countably inﬁnite) model.
Proof: By Corollary 4.8, if φ is satisﬁable, φ is satisﬁable
in L(σ0). And all elements of L(σ0) are countable.
Theorem 4.10 (a) Satisﬁability of FO(ID) formulas is Σ1
2
over N. (b) For FO(ID) formulas φ,ψ, determining whether
ψ logically implies ψ is Π1
2 over N.
Proof: (a) is a consequence of Theorem 4.4 and Corol-
lary 4.8. (b) follows immediately.
5 Inference in FO(ID) is Π1
2-hard over
Arithmetic
We show here that determining whether T |=[ID] φ, for T an
FO(ID)theoryandφﬁrstorder, isΠ1
2-hard(overarithmetic),
even in the special case where ∆ is a system of positive in-
ductive deﬁnitions.
Example 5.1 Let τ be the usual language {0,<,Succ,+,·}
for arithmetic, plus one unary relation S to be inductively
deﬁned. There is a ﬁnite FO(ID) theory TN whose models
(or rather, their reducts to {0,<,Succ,+,·}) are just the
isomorphic copies of N. And all deﬁnitional rules in TN are
positive. For example, takeTN to bePeano’s theory in which
the induction schema is replaced by
∀xN(x) ∧

∀x(N(x) ← x = 0),
∀x(N(x) ← ∃y(x = Succ(y) ∧ N(y)))

All models A of Peano’s axioms (with or with-
out the induction schema) have a “standard part”
{0A,p1qA,p2qA,p3qA,...}, which is isomorphic to N.
The positive inductive deﬁnition deﬁnes N as this set. So
∀xN(x) asserts that every element is in the standard model,
as desired.
Observation 5.1 (Relativized Kleene-Spector Theorem)
There are a recursive function f from formulas φ(X,Y,x)
to Y -positive formulas φf(X,Y,z) and a recursive
function g from formulas φ(X,Y,x) to integers φg,
such that, for all n ∈ N and all sets X ⊆ N, for
∆ = {∀z[Y (z) ← φf(X,Y,z)]},
N[X/X] |= ∀Y φ(X,Y,x)[n/x]
if and only if
hn,φgi ∈ Y N[X/X],∆
Proof (sketch): The proof is a straightforward modiﬁca-
tion of the proof of Moschovakis’ generalization in §8A of
(Moschovakis 1974a). The observations are merely that (i)
the proof there constructs a formula explicitly — and thus
recursively — from φ, and (ii) the extra relation X may be
just carried along as a parameter.
Theorem 5.2 (a) Determining whether a ﬁnite FO(ID) the-
ory is satisﬁable is Σ1
2-hard over N. (b) Determining
whether T |=[ID] ψ, for T a FO(ID) theory and ψ FO(ID)
formula, is Π1
2-hard over N.
Proof: As usual, (a) implies (b). We show (a) even in
the special case where the FO(ID) formula is of the form
ψ ∧ ∆ where ψ is ﬁrst order and ∆ is a single positive (in-
ductive) deﬁnition. We continue to use the notations from
above. We use that fact that, when an (inductive) deﬁni-
tion is positive, the inductively deﬁned relations always ex-
ist. Let ∆ = {∀z[Y (z) ← φf(X,Y,z)]}.
N |= ∃X∀Y φ(X,Y,n)
if and only if
∃X ⊆ N(hn,φgi ∈ Y N[X/X],∆if and only if
TN ∪ ∆ ∪ {Y (hpnq,pφgqi)} is satisﬁable in ID-Logic.
An interesting observation is that, although the expressive
power of the well-founded induction of FO(ID) is, in gen-
eral, greater than that of ﬁrst order positive induction, the
complexity of determining satisﬁability for FO[ID] is the
same as it is for ﬁrst order logic plus just positive inductive
deﬁnability.
6 Open Problem: Expressive Power
Well-founded Induction N
Here we have discussed the expressive power of FO(ID). A
related issue is the expressive power of just well-founded in-
ductive deﬁnitions — as interpreted in FO(ID) (see Subsec-
tion2.2)—overparticularstructures. Theclassicalstructure
to consider is N. So what relations are deﬁnable using well-
founded induction over N? Since FO(ID)’s inductive deﬁni-
tions include all positive inductive deﬁnitions, it follows by
the Kleene-Spector Theorem that all Π1
1 relations on N are
so deﬁnable. It follows easily from Theorem 5.2 that all so
deﬁnable relations are Π1
2 over N. But neither the Π1
1- nor
Π1
2-deﬁnablerelationsareclosedundercomplementation, so
the sets deﬁnable using just FO(ID)’s nonmonotonic induc-
tion are strictly in between the two. We pose this question
for further research.
References
Aczel, P. 1977. An introduction to inductive deﬁnitions,
In J. Barwise, editor, Handbook of Mathematical Logic,
pages 739–782, North-Holland, New York.
Barwise, J. 1975. Admissible Sets and Structures.
Springer-Verlag, New York.
Denecker, M., and Ternovska, E. 2004. A logic of non-
monotone inductive deﬁnitions and its modularity proper-
ties. In Lifschitz, V., and Niemel¨ a, I., eds., Seventh In-
ternational Conference on Logic Programming and Non-
monotonic Reasoning (LPNMR’7).
Denecker, M., and Ternovska, E. 2007. A logic of non-
monotone inductive deﬁnitions. Transactions On Compu-
tational Logic (TOCL). to appear.
Denecker, M.; Bruynooghe, M.; and Marek, V. 2001.
Logic programming revisited: Logic programs as inductive
deﬁnitions. ACM Transactions on Computational Logic
2(4):623–654.
Denecker, M. 2000. Extending classical logic with induc-
tive deﬁnitions. In Lloyd et al., J., ed., First International
Conference on Computational Logic (CL’2000), volume
1861 of Lecture Notes in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, 703–717.
London: Springer.
Gelfond, M., and Lifschitz, V. 1991. Classical negation in
logic programs and disjunctive databases. New Generation
Computing 9:365–387.
Immerman, N. 1986. Relational queries computable in
polynomial time. Information and Control, 68(1), 86–104.
Libkin, L. 2004. Elements of Finite Model Theory.
Springer.
Mitchell, D., and Ternovska, E. 2005. A framework for
representing and solving np search problems. In AAAI’05,
430–435. AAAI Press/MIT Press.
Moschovakis, Y. N. 1974a. Elementary Induction on
Abstract Structures. North-Holland Publishing Company,
Amsterdam- New York.
Moschovakis, Y. N. 1974b. On non-monotone inductive
deﬁnability. Fundamenta Mathematicae 82(39-83).
Schlipf, J. 1995. Complexity and undecidability results in
logic programming. Annals of Mathematics and Artiﬁcial
Intelligence 15, 257-288.
Vardi, M. 1982. The complexity of relational query lan-
guages. In 14th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
137-145.
Van Gelder, A.; Ross, K. A.; and Schlipf, J. S. 1991. The
well-founded semantics for general logic programs. Jour-
nal of the ACM 38(3):620–650.
Van Gelder, A. 1993. The alternating ﬁxpoint of logic
programs with negation. Journal of Computer and System
Sciences 47(1):185–221.
Vennekens, J.; Gilis, D.; and Denecker, M. 2006. Splitting
an operator: Algebraic modularity results for logics with
ﬁxpoint semantics. ACM Transactions on computational
logic (TOCL) 7(4):765–797.